Portfolio managers
• Two portfolio managers i, i = 1, 2, manager i is familiar only with asset i, so her choice variable is φ it -the share of wealth invested in asset i at time t 
• Competition arises as manager i's objective is given by

Nash Equilibrium
• Relative performance concerns combined with asset specialization imply that each manager faces incomplete markets
• Use dynamic programming to solve for a Nash equilibrium: a pair (φ Introduction Setting Portfolios Specialization Changing environment Conclusion
Nash Equilibrium Portfolio Policies
• The equilibrium is
• Assume that in the above the numerators and denominators are positive, for equilibrium stability w.r.t. to best response dynamics and to preclude stock shorting 
Asset Specialization versus No Specialization
• Consider the no specialization scenario where each manager can trade in both stocks
• If each manager prefers no specialization over specialization, competition is a possible mechanism behind asset specialization (underdiversification)
• Consider parameters λ 1 and λ 2 , where
where J i (·) is manager i's equilibrium expected utility under asset specialization, and J N oSp i (·)-under no specialization
• Manager i loses from specialization when λ i > 0, but benefits from specialization when λ i < 0 
Client Investor
• Consider manager 1's client investor with CRRA utility
γ c > 0 is the client's relative risk aversion
• Consider parameter λ c measuring the effect of specialization on the client:
Effect of Asset Specialization: Managers
For manager 1, we get
where m and n are
Effect of Asset Specialization: Client
For manager 1's client, we get 
Changing Economic Environment: Effect on Clients
• Economic role of managers-save client's time and effort by trading on her behalf. Client only needs to pick the right manager at the beginning
• Will the initially "right" manager remain the "right" one if economic environment changes?
• If we switch off the competition channel, the answer is yes -Manager 1 is the right one if γ 1 = γ c -If stock characteristics µ 1 or σ 1 change, manager 1 will adjust her strategy, but the new strategy (µ 1 − r)/(γ 1 σ 2 1 ) will be optimal for the client -The client can lose only if her manager is replaced by a new one with different risk aversion
Client's Cost from Changing Environment
• Denoting by hatˆstrategies after a model parameter changes, the client's cost λ c is
The value λ c > 0 is the percentage of wealth the client is prepared to pay to induce her manager to follow the desired (by the client) strategŷ φ c . We obtain: Changing Environment: Key Results
• Client is more sensitive to (change in) characteristics of her own manager than those of competitor manager
• Client is equally sensitive to characteristics of her manager's stock and those of the other manager's stock, the one in which her manager does not trade
• Key intuition: in the former case, the client's desired strategy remains the same, in the latter case, it does change
• Without competition, the "right" manager 1 remains "right" for the client for any change in stock 1 characteristics change; under competition, this is no longer the case 
Summary
• Relative performance concern θ needs to be sufficiently high for the risk tolerant manager to prefer specialization over no specialization
• If manager is risk intolerant, she values diversification (no specialization) more when her relative concern θ increases • Under competition, the client can benefit if her risk intolerant manager specializes rather than invests in all assets
